

Key terms + ideas

- bureaucratic vs. patrimonial state
- “brown areas”
- “Taylorland”
- settler colonies
- limited war
- protection vs. provision pact

Key questions

Q: What are the important dimensions of the state according to Fukuyama? How does he use these dimensions to define state-building?

A: In Fukuyama (2004), there are two dimensions of the state. First, states are defined by the *scope* of their activities, or the degree to which the government pursues an ambitious range of policies. Second, Fukuyama identifies another distinct dimension in *state power* that he defines as the ability to enforce institutional decisions. Over time, states change their position on these two dimensions. This change describes state-building when the process creates new governmental institutions or strengthens existing ones.

Q: What analogy does Tilly draw?

A: Tilly compares the state to a criminal organization that exchanges rents for protection services, or a *protection racket*. In his view, citizens trade tax payments in exchange for physical protection by state institutions like the military and police of themselves and their communities.

Q: What is Tilly’s main argument? In what ways does a state’s propensity for war-making facilitate state building?

A: In his seminal piece, Tilly argues for a *weight-lifting theory* of state building, or in other words, the threat of war forces the state to invest in extractive institutions in order to increase their chance of survival by maximizing capital accumulation to fight future wars more effectively. This inducement mechanism, the existential threat of war, motivates leaders and other elites to invest in long-term solutions; rather than behaving like warlords, leaders under constant threat of takeover are more likely to build institutions that help them accrue taxation revenue. All else equal, the more costly the action in terms of marshalling extractive capacities, the greater the state building opportunity.

Q: What are the main tasks of states according to Tilly? What do they entail?

A: Tilly sees the state’s four central tasks as: (1) war-making to define borders, (2) state-making to co-opt the population into allies, (3) protection against enemies of the state’s internal allies, and (4) extraction of resources to fight wars. In real terms, the state’s war-making necessitates an army, state-making a police force, protection creates courts, and extraction leads to taxation. The balance of a state’s emphasis on these tasks shapes the organization of the state.

Week's readings

- Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperatives of State-Building”, pp. 17-31.
- Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, pp. 169-191.
- Miguel Centeno, “Blood and Debt”, pp. 1-26, 33-47.
- Jeffrey Herbst, “States and Power in Africa”, pp. 11-28, 97-106; 112-121, 254-255.
- Dan Slater, “Ordering Power”, pp. 3-27.
- Mark Dinecco and Yuhua Wang, “Violent Conflict and Political Development Over the Long Run: China Versus Europe”, pp. 341-352.
- Pavithra Suryanarayan, “Hollowing Out the State”. Working paper.

Review questions

Check your understanding of this week's material and key ideas with the following questions.

1. What are the detailed outputs of state building? How are they different from state capacity?
2. Does war always make the state? What are the cases where it doesn't?
3. Per Tilly, what are the important steps in the bellicist theory's causal chain? All else equal, what does more "costly" action portend? In practice, what does that look like?
4. Why does Herbst think states are weaker in Africa? Would Bates agree with Herbst's take?
5. Is Slater's logic fundamentally different from Tilly's? In what ways is it similar and in what ways is it different?
6. What does Fukuyama mean when he references that states try to solve the problem of “getting to Denmark” (Fukuyama 2004, p. 30)? Does he think every state can achieve this, and what are the characteristics that he believes holds states back?

References

Fukuyama, Francis (2004). “The Imperative of State-Building”. In: *Journal of Democracy* 15.2. Publisher: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 17–31. ISSN: 1086-3214. URL: <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/54670> (visited on 09/22/2024).